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Political Party Contributions and
Expenditures Under the Federal Election
Campaign Act: Anomalies and Unfinished
Business
JO FREEMANt
I. Introduction
The corruption and abuses of the electoral process uncov-
ered during the Watergate investigations prompted the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
which regulates the financing of federal election campaigns.' The
Supreme Court decided, however, that some of these justifiable
reforms exceeded constitutional bounds. In Buckley v. Valeo,2 a
1976 decision, the Court held that restrictions on campaign ex-
penditures could not withstand strict first amendment scrutiny,
but limitations on campaign contributions were warranted by
the compelling state interest of preventing the actuality and ap-
pearance of corruption.a
What the Supreme Court left unanswered in Buckley is how
t J.D., New York University School of Law; Ph.D., University of Chicago.
1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1982)).
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
3. In Buckley, the Court struck down as violative of the first amendment those por-
tions of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 which imposed a $1000
ceiling on: (1) independent expenditures on behalf of a specifically designated candidate;
(2) a $25,000 ceiling on expenditures by a candidate from his or her personal or family
funds; and (3) a limit on aggregate campaign expenditures by any one candidate. The
Court equated political expenditures with political speech and subjected the direct limi-
tations to the strictest scrutiny. The Court upheld: (1) a $1000 limitation on contribu-
tions by individuals or groups to any candidate for federal office; (2) a $25,000 limit on
the aggregate contributions that an individual could make annually to all political cam-
paigns; and (3) a $5000 limit on contributions by political committees. The contribution
limitations were viewed as entailing only a "marginal restriction upon the contributor's
ability to engage in free communication," (id. at 20-21), and were thus subjected to less
exacting scrutiny. The state interest in limiting contributions as a hedge against
campaign finance corruption sufficiently outweighed the contributors' free speech
interests.
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its rationale pertains to political parties. Although rhetoric has
flowed regarding the importance of political parties for the dem-
ocratic process in general and the electoral system in particular,
neither Congress, nor the courts have analyzed precisely what
that role is or how political parties may differ from other multi-
candidate committees.
This Article will demonstrate how the federal statutory and
regulatory mechanics governing political campaigns have been
reformed in the wake of the Buckley decision; then how case law
has highlighted inconsistencies and generated further structural
defects of the federal election laws with consequences for local
and state as well as federal political organizations.' This Article
will then examine how the Buckley criteria for limiting cam-
paign contributions could be applicable to political parties on all
levels. Finally, the potential consequences to political parties of
applying the Buckley criteria to the statutory framework of the
FECA will be raised. The Article will conclude that electoral re-
form has far-reaching implications and that the impact of these
revisions on the structure of national, state and local political
parties has yet to be ascertained.
4. See infra notes 48-67, 75-78, 108-11 and accompanying text. The Article will fo-
cus on congressional elections as the Court held in Buckley that the presence of public
funding of presidential races permits Congress to condition acceptance of such findings
on limitations not otherwise permitted. While it is the candidate and not the party that
accepts the funds, parties are implicated in those limitations in ways that would require
a different analysis than that applicable to unfunded races because of the requirement of
§ 9002(2) of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, defining a candidate as one
who
(A) has been nominated for election to the office of President of the United
States or the office of Vice President of the United States by a major party, or
(B) has qualified to have his name on the election ballot or to have the names
of the electors pledged to him on the election ballot as the candidate of a political
party for election to either such office in 10 or more states.
26 U.S.C. § 9002(2) (1976).
Despite his independence from party labels, John Anderson was found in Advisory
Opinion 1980-96 to have been nominated by a sufficient number of state organizations to
qualify as a candidate under this definition. A party label is not required to be a candi-
date under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Section 431(2) defines a candidate as "an
individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to Federal office." 2 U.S.C. §
431(2) (1982).
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II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) there
are three types of outlays that political committees can make in
support of a candidate, although only two of them are defined
by the FECA. These outlays are called "contributions," "inde-
pendent expenditures," and "co-ordinated expenditures." Con-
tributions are defined by section 431(8)(A) of the Act as:
(i) any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money
or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influ-
encing any election for Federal office; or
(ii) the payment by any person of compensation for the per-
sonal services of another person which are rendered to a political
committee without charge for any purpose.'
This simple definition is followed by a list of fourteen items
which are not to be considered contributions. Those specific to
political parties will be discussed in Part IV. How much a politi-
cal committee can contribute to a candidate depends on what
kind of committee it is. Section 441(a) of the FECA1 provides
that those qualifying as multicandidate committees, including
party committees, may contribute up to $5000 per election. An
exception is made by section 441a(h) for the republican or dem-
ocratic senatorial campaign committees which share with their
national committees a joint contribution limit of $17,500 to a
Senate candidate during the year in which the relevant election
is held.8
The definition of "independent expenditure" is more con-
cise. Under section 431(17) it means
an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate which is made without co-
operation or consultation with any candidate, or any authorized
committee or agent of such candidate, and which is not made in
concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or
any authorized committee or agent of such candidate.'
5. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i)-(ii) (1982).
6..ld. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
7. Id. § 441a(a)(1)(A).
8. Id. § 441a(h).
9. Id. § 431(17).
1984]
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This definition was added after the Supreme Court in Buckley v.
Valeo'0 invalidated limits on independent expenditures on first
amendment grounds. Congress then sought, as much as possi-
ble, to combine the effect of this ruling through this new, narrow
definition of independence and through disclosure and reporting
requirements."'
Co-ordinated expenditures are not specifically defined, nor
is the term used, in either the Act or the regulations. Instead the
FEC employs that term in its other literature 2 to refer to sec-
tion 441a(d) expenditures by the national and state committees
of political parties. That section provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law with respect
to limitations on expenditures or limitations on contributions, the
national committee of a political party and a State committee of a
political party, including any subordinate committee of a State
committee, may make expenditures in connection with the gen-
eral election campaign of candidates for Federal office, subject to
the limitations contained in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this
subsection.
(2) The national committee of a political party may not
make any expenditure in connection with the general election
campaign of any candidate for President of the United States
who is affiliated with such party which exceeds an amount equal
to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United
States . . . . Any expenditure under this paragraph shall be in
addition to any expenditure by a national committee of a political
party serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate
for the office of President of the United States.
(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State
committee of a political party, including any subordinate commit-
tee of a State committee, may not make any expenditure in con-
nection with the general election campaign of a candidate for
Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party which
exceeds -
(A) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of
Senator, or of Representative from a State which is entitled to
only one Representative, the greater of -
10. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 917, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 5 (1976).
12. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the
State . .. ; or
(ii) $20,000; and
(B) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of
Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner in any other
State, $10,000.3
The term "co-ordinated expenditure" appears in the FEC's
Guide for Party Committees," which explains that these ex-
penditures differ from contributions in that they can be made
only in the general election campaign, must be either "in-kind,"
or, if monetary, must go directly to a supplier rather than
through a candidate, and need be reported only by the party
committee, not the candidate. 5 Only political parties can make
co-ordinated expenditures. Since they can be made in co-opera-
tion or consultation with a candidate, they would be deemed
contributions if made by any other type of political committee.
Conversely, the FEC has ruled that parties cannot make in-
dependent expenditures. There is no specific authorization for
this ruling in the FECA. Although the language of section
441a(d)(1) which states: "Notwithstanding any other provision
of the law with respect to limitations on expenditures or limita-
tions on contributions," 6 implies that there are other kinds of
expenditures that can be made by political parties, such as co-
ordinated expenditures, the FEC submitted to Congress regula-
tion 110.7(b)(4), which prohibits state and national party com-
mittees from making independent expenditures in general elec-
tions.' 7 Initially the FEC had proposed an alternative clause
stating that the presumption that parties could not make truly
independent expenditures should be rebuttable rather than con-
clusive. 8 By the time the third and final version was submitted
on August 25, 1976 (and resubmitted the following spring due to
Congress' early adjournment) this alternative had been
13. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1982).
14. Federal Election Commission, Campaign Guide for Party Committees 9 (March,
1981).
15. Id.
16. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
17. 11 C.F.R. § 1l0.7(b)-(c) (1983).
18. Federal Election Campaign Act Proposed Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,587
(1976).
19841
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removed.19
Congress tacitly approved this interpretation by its failure
to veto the proposed regulations as permitted by section
438(d). 20 However, the "detailed explanation and justification"
of the regulations which that section requires as an accompani-
ment to the proposals21 provided neither. The FEC did not pro-
vide a written explanation of the prohibition against indepen-
dent expenditures by parties, but FEC staff justified it as a
logical extrapolation of regulation 109.22 That regulation sets out
in broad terms that the co-operation or consultation between a
candidate and a supporter will deprive an expenditure of its in-
dependence. Indeed, such co-operation is presumed when it is:
(A) Based on information about the candidate's plans,
projects, or needs provided to the expending person by the candi-
date, or by the candidate's agents, with a view toward having an
expenditure made;
(B) Made by or through any person who is, or has been, au-
thorized to raise or expend funds, who is, or has been, an officer
of an authorized committee, or who is, or has been, receiving any
form of compensation or reimbursement from the candidate, the
candidate's committee or agent. 3
The FEC has elaborated on this regulation in a series of Ad-
visory Opinions in response to specific requests for guidance -
most frequently from the National Conservative Political Action
Committee.2 These judgments have consistently imposed re-
strictions on proposed activities by independent committees.
The FEC appears to be following Congress' lead in using those
means not prohibited by Buckley to regulate and limit indepen-
dent spending. The prohibition against independent expendi-
tures by parties may be open to question.2 The FEC assumes
that parties are so closely tied into their candidates that they
19. 41 Fed. Reg. 35,951 (1976) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1983)).
20. 2 U.S.C. § 438(d) (1982).
21. Id. § 438(d)(1).
22. Federal Election Campaign Act Proposed Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,587
(1976).
23. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(4)(i)(A)-(B) (1983).
24. See 80 Op. F.E.C. (1979); 46 Op. F.E.C. (1980).
25. Federal Election Campaign Act Proposed Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,587
(1976).
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could not make both co-ordinated and independent expendi-
tures; that the consultation inherent in one would preempt the
lack of consultation necessary to the other. Such an assumption
implies that all party committees have the same relationship to
the candidates that bear their name. It ignores the very real dif-
ference in treatment by the FECA and its regulations of local,
state and national party committees. It ignores the fact that
many state and local committees have transferred their right to
make co-ordinated expenditures to their congressional campaign
committees."
There is, however, no particular demand by the parties for
unlimited independent expenditures. This is partially because
the ceiling on co-ordinated expenditures appears to be greater
than the fund raising ability of the parties, and partially because
it is not in the interest of the Democratic Party, which still con-
trols the House, to give the republicans greater spending power.
In the 1981-1982 election cycle the democrats spent $3,195,199
on congressional candidates and donated $1,723,593 to them.
The republicans spent four times more: $14,284,963 in co-ordi-
nated expenditures and $5,626,216 in contributions.27
The consequence of these FEC interpretations is to create a
strange mosaic depending on whether a financial supporter is a
party committee or not. Party committees can make contribu-
tions and limited but co-ordinated expenditures. Non-party
committees and individuals can make contributions and unlim-
ited independent expenditures. This novel interpretation has
both benefited and hindered parties in comparison with non-
party political committees. It has benefited them in that more
money could be spent in co-operation with a campaign, and thus
presumably more efficiently. It has hindered parties in that the
unlimited independent expenditures permitted non-party com-
mittees are precluded. As will be demonstrated later, this mosaic
is complicated further by the different treatment of state, local
and national party committees. National party committees are
clearly the favored sons and daughters; a favoritism bestowed on
them by Congress, elaborated on by FEC regulations and Advi-
26. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
27. Federal Election Commission, Press Release, Dec. 3, 1983, at 30.
1984]
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
sory Opinions, and sanctified by the Supreme Court. 8
III. Consequences of the Failure of the Supreme Court to
Apply the Buckley Standards to Political Parties
The source of this mosaic was not congressional deliberation
on the manner in which party and non-party committees ought
to fit into an overall campaign finance scheme, but the failure of
the Supreme Court to address how parties were affected by the
criteria of constitutional limitations upon campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures. When it distinguished in Buckley v.
Valeo2  between campaign contributions, which were permissibly
subject to congressional limitations, and independent expendi-
tures, which were not, the Court's decision was restricted to non-
party political committees and individuals. Parties were given
only a passing mention in two footnotes where the Court
claimed that no first amendment challenge had been made by
the plaintiffs to "separate limitations for general election ex-
penditures by national and state committees of political par-
ties."80 Footnote sixty-six states:
Appellants do not challenge these ceilings on First Amendment
grounds. Instead, they contend that the provisions discriminate
against independent candidates and regional political parties
without national committees because they permit additional
spending by political parties with national committees. Our deci-
sion today holding ... independent expenditure limitation[s] un-
constitutional and ... campaign expenditure ceilings unconstitu-
tional removes the predicate for appellants' discrimination claim
by eliminating any alleged advantage to political parties with na-
tional committees.31
The Court's decision not to apply the standards of Buckley
to the major political parties was not compelled by a clear read-
ing of the plaintiffs' brief. Argument III of the brief entitled
"[Tihe FECA Limitation on Campaign Expenditures by Politi-
cal Candidates, Parties or Committees Violate the Constitu-
28. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
29. 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976). See also FEC v. NCPAC, No. 83-2823 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12,
1983).
30. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58 nn. 66-67.
31. Id.
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tion"' " did not single out parties in the general sections of this
argument, but the brief did state that "[w]hat is true of candi-
dates is also true of political parties and committees."3 3 Parties
were specifically addressed in section E of Argument III entitled
"The Limits Imposed by the FECA Amendments Violate the
First and Fifth Amendments Because They Discriminate
Against Certain Candidates and Parties. '3 The thrust of that
section was that "distinctions between various kinds of party
committees, other formal political committees, and informal as-
sociations are unprecedented in American election law and serve
no purpose other than discrimination."' 5 Nonetheless, to inter-
pret that thrust as a failure to challenge the ceilings on first
amendment grounds indicates a narrowness more deliberate
than accidental. It implies that the Court has reserved for an-
other time how the standards of Buckley should be applied to
political parties.
One consequence of the Buckley omission was to create
something of an anomaly in section 441a(d).' This section was
originally written as section 608(f) of the 1974 amendments to
the FECA when Congress contemplated total public funding of
general election campaigns for federal office. In that context,
expenditure limits on parties were analogous to but greater than
those on other "persons" (defined by the Act to include political
committees)." The rather rapid revision of FECA in the wake of
the Court's far-reaching decision removed the now unconstitu-
tional section 608(e) on "expenditures relative to clearly identi-
fied candidates"' 9 but overlooked that on expenditures by party
committees and with it the possibility that expenditure limits on
parties were just as unconstitutional as those on non-party polit-
ical committees. The FEC resolved the apparent discrepancy
when it first proposed regulations for the amended FECA in
32. Brief for Appellant at 79, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
33. Id. at 85.
34. Id. at 104.
35. Id. at 106.
36. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982).
37. S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(a) (1974).
38. 2 U.S.C. § 431(11) (1982).
39. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263, 1265 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1974)) (repealed 1976).
1984]
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May, 1976 by interpreting renumbered section 441a(d) to create
the unique category of co-ordinated expenditures. 0 Since these
"expenditures" are actually in-kind contributions, the FEC's in-
terpretation significantly increased the amount of direct support
parties can give candidates compared to other political
committees.
The legislative basis for co-ordinated expenditures is rather
sparse, consisting solely of an obscure reference in the Confer-
ence Report on the 1976 FECA. There the Conference Commit-
tee stated:
The conference substitute is the same as the House amend-
ment and the Senate bill with regard to political party expendi-
tures on behalf of the party's candidates. This limited permission
allows the political parties to make contributions in kind by
spending money for certain functions to aid the individual candi-
dates who represent the party during the election process. Thus,
but for this subsection, these expenditures would be covered by
the contribution limitations stated in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2)
of this provision.41
The 1976 amendments created in section 441a(h) separate
contribution (not co-ordinated expenditure) limits of $17,500 for
the republican and democratic senatorial campaign committees,
but not for the equivalent House committees.42 The latter, by
omission, is treated the same as any multicandidate committee
with a $5000 limit.4" However, the Senate committees share
their limits with the national party committees by statute,"
while the House has separate limits from the national commit-
tees under regulation 110.3(b)(2) (i).4 5
One could reasonably interpret this pattern as indicating a
congressional intention that each of the main party committees
should have distinct, but not cumulative, contribution limits re-
flecting the size and type of their potential candidate constitu-
ency. State and national party committees could each contribute
up to two cents per voter or $20,000 to Senate candidates and
40. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
41. H.R. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1976).
42. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h) (1976).
43. Id. § 441a(a)(2)(A).
44. Id. § 441a(h).
45. 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(b)(2)(i) (1983).
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$10,000 to those for the House.4" The Senate campaign commit-
tees could contribute $17,500 to Senate candidates and the
House campaign committees $5000 to House candidates.47 In-
stead, the FEC has increased the spending power of all party
bodies by interpreting the limits cumulatively, by distinguishing
co-ordinated expenditures from contributions and by permitting
agency agreements. It is only the latter that has been challenged
in court.
IV. Agency Agreements
Agency agreements were the subject of the only case under
the FECA on political parties to come before the Supreme
Court, FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
(DSCC). 8 It arose when DSCC challenged in the district court a
ruling by the FEC that there was no "reason to believe" that the
National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) had vio-
lated the FECA by acting as the agent of state republican par-
ties in order to make their allotted co-ordinated expenditures
under section 441a(d)(3).49
The DSCC charged that rather than directing the NRSC to
spend state money, as ordinary agency agreements might, the
state parties were transferring their spending authority to the
NRSC so that it might spend more of its own money than would
otherwise be permitted by the FECA contribution limits. The
FEC said that this was "placing form over substance. '50 It
claimed that since 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4) permits unlimited
transfers of funds "between and among political committees
which are national, state, district or local committees (including
any subordinate committee thereof) of the same political party"
there was no substantive difference between transferring spend-
ing authority from the states and transferring funds to them.
5 1
46. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a)(d)(3)(A)-(B) (1982).
47. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
48. 454 U.S. 27 (1981), rev'g 660 F.2d 773 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
49. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 660 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
50. Id. at 781.
51. Federal Election Commission Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 11,
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. FEC, No. 80-1903 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1980).
19841
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The dispute began in 1978 when several republican state
committees signed agency agreements with the NRSC which re-
sulted in two complaints with FEC52 after the NRSC spent
$2,599,290 in 1978 senate campaigns as agent for the Republican
National Committee (RNC) and $579,974 as agent for various
state parties .5 The Democratic National Committee (DNC) had
previously filed a complaint challenging the 1976 agency agree-
ment between the RNC and NRSC, but later withdrew it and
made a similar arrangement with DSCC to make its section
441a(d)(3) expenditures. 4 Both of the 1978 complaints were dis-
missed after review by the FEC, as was a third complaint filed
by the DSCC on May 9, 1980."5 In response to this third dismis-
sal, the DSCC filed a petition for review with the United States
District Court of the District of Columbia on July 30, 1980
under 2 U.S.C. § 437(8)(A), asserting that the agency agreements
between the state committees and the NRSC were improper.5 6
After cross motions for summary judgment and oral argu-
ment, the district court found in favor of the FEC. Its ruling was
not on the merits, but on the ground that the relevant question
was one of deference due an agency in the administration of its
statute. Unless the FEC's determination was arbitrary, capri-
cious or not in accordance with the law, this deference required
that its decisions be sustained.5 7
52. National Comm. for an Effective Congress v. National Republican Senatorial
Comm., FEC Matter under Review No. 780 (1978); Friends of Stewart Comm. v. Na-
tional Republican Senatorial Comm., FEC Matter under Review No. 820 (1978).
53. Federal Election Commission Reports on Financial Activity, 1977-78, Final Re-
port - Party and Non-Party Political Committees at 127. National 441(d)(3) expendi-
tures by the Democratic Party for the 1977-78 election cycle were only $68,822 and state
expenditures were $329,765. Id. at 125.
54. The national committee's assignment of its co-ordinated expenditure limits to a
congressional campaign committee is not surprising when one understands the different
historical roles of the two committees. The major parties' national committees have gen-
erally focused on presidential politics with at best weak and informal ties to Congress. D.
IPPOLITO & T. WALKER, POLITICAL PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND PUBLIC POLICY: GROUP
INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 67, 72-73 (1980). Congressional campaign committees
were established by both parties in 1866 to help their members get re-elected. A. RAN-
NEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION: PARTY REFORM IN AMERICA 17 (1975). Thus they
are the more logical party units to make co-ordinated expenditures for congressional
candidates.
55. MUR 1234.
56. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM., ELECTION CASE LAW 55-56 (1981).
57. Id. at 56.
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A three-judge appeals court heard argument less than a
month later and on October 9, 1980, two of the judges decided
otherwise. Stating that "we deal in this case, not with a discre-
tionary exercise of Commission power, but with an interpreta-
tion of a federal statute," 8 it justified its de novo review on the
grounds that the Commission had presented no reasoned expla-
nation of its decision.59 The court found that the FEC General
Counsel's report of previous complaints about the agency agree-
ments which formed the basis of its ruling lacked consistency. 0
Thus the circuit court concluded that "we must decide for our-
selves whether the action of the Commission was 'contrary to
law.' "61
It concluded that the plain language of section 441a(d)(3)
precludes agency agreements between state committees and the
NRSC because the NRSC was not in fact an agent but a princi-
pal which raises and spends its money as it sees fit.6 2 Quoting
from the legislative history, the circuit court noted that Con-
gress had had ample opportunity to indicate whether the spend-
ing authority of the state and national committees could be
shared with the congressional campaign committees and had not
done so. It rejected the contention of the NRSC that it itself was
a national committee by asserting that it was not the national
committee referred to in the definitions section, section 431, of
the FECA, and concluded that party organizations could not re-
write section 441a(d)(3) "to displace state committees and sub-
stitute congressional campaign committees in their stead.""
The Supreme Court reversed unanimously without reaching
any of the constitutional issues raised. Instead it held that sec-
tion 441a(d)(3) "does not expressly or by necessary implication
foreclose the agency agreements. 6 4 Its reading of the legislative
history of the statute was that either interpretation was permis-
sible, therefore, the Commission's conclusion should be deferred
58. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 660 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
59. Id. at 777.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 778.
62. Id. at 779.
63. Id. at 782 n.37.
64. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981).
1984]
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to. It then added that the "Commission's interpretation is not
inconsistent with any discernible purpose of the Act." 6 Because
the agency agreements did not permit the "expenditure of a sin-
gle additional dollar,"" they had no effect on corruption or the
prevention of corruption.
This assertion reinforces the rationale of Buckley v. Valeo
that prevention of corruption or the appearance of corruption is
the only state interest sufficiently compelling to permit a limita-
tion of first amendment rights. The implication had been chal-
lenged by the DSCC in its brief when it argued that if a limita-
tion on agency agreements could be shown to be a burden on the
NRSC's first amendment rights, that burden would be justified
by the fundamental state interest of fostering "active participa-
tion by State and local political parties in the federal elective
process." '67 This assertion was dismissed by the Court because
"none of the limited legislative history . . . supports this
view.""8
V. State and Local Political Parties in the Federal Elective
Process
Fostering the active participation of state and local political
parties in the federal elective process may not be a compelling
state interest in the eyes of the Supreme Court, but it has been a
compelling concern of Congress. After the 1976 election, political
party leaders complained that the FECA almost completely
eliminated state and local party organizations from the presi-
dential campaign. The restrictions on spending imposed by the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act precluded local party
organizations from engaging in the extensive fund raising activ-
ites of previous campaigns, and consequently deprived them of a
major portion of their campaign activity. These limitations also
discouraged the national parties from spending money on the
traditional tools of grass-roots politics such as buttons and
bumper stickers in favor of the more cost effective media
65. Id. at 41.
66. Id.
67. Brief for Respondent at 38-39, FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm.,
454 U.S. 27 (1981).
68. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 41-42 & n.22.
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advertising. 9
Consequently, in 1979 the FECA was amended to exempt
from the definition of contributions and expenditures the
purchase of these traditional campaign materials for volunteer
activities in general elections,70 and the conduct of voter regis-
tration and get-out-the-vote drives for presidential candidates.
The original section of the FECA has permitted slate cards and
sample ballots.7 2 If parties had been permitted to make indepen-
dent expenditures, these amendments might not have been nec-
essary. Parties could have bought an unlimited amount of grass-
roots campaign materials as long as they did not consult with or
duplicate those put out by the candidate (which are deemed
contributions under 11 C.F.R. section 109.1(d)(1)). 3 They could
only have engaged in voter drives or other activities for presi-
dential candidates up to a cost of $1000 prior to 1980.7' But
since the United States District Court of the District of Colum-
bia ruled in 1980 that the $1000 limitation under section 9012(f)
on independent expenditures by unauthorized (non-party) polit-
ical committees in presidential campaigns was unconstitutional,
that is no longer true. 6 Since that holding, left standing by the
Supreme Court in a 4 to 4 split vote 7 6 non-party committees can
make unlimited expenditures in support of presidential candi-
dates as long as they are done independently of the campaign,
but local committees of a candidate's own party, no matter how
remote they are from the campaign itself, can spend very little.
Non-party committees can also make expenditures in prima-
ries.7 7 Parties are limited to contributions, and volunteer cam-
paign materials are not exempted from these limits.7 8
69. 35 CONG. QuARTERY ALMANAC 559 (1979).
70. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(x) (1982) (contribution exemption); id. § 431(9)(B)(viii)
(expenditure exemption).
71. Id. § 431(8)(B)(xii) (contribution exemption); see also id. § 431(9)(B)(ix) (expen-
diture exemption). These exemptions apply to presidential and vice presidential candi-
dates only.
72. Id. §§ 431(8)(b)(v), (9)(b)(vi).
73. 11 C.F.R. § 109.1(d)(1) (1983).
74. 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1976).
75. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489, 501 (D.D.C. 1980).
76. Common Cause v. Schmitt, 455 U.S. 129 (1982) (per curiam).
77. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1982); see supra text accompanying note 13.
78. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. See infra notes 81-82 and accompa-
nying text.
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Paradoxically, despite the implementation of the 1979
amendments to enhance participation by local and state parties,
this legislation has decreased the ability of local and state par-
ties to initiate in presidential participate campaigns. This was
made particularly clear in Advisory Opinion 1980-87. 79 The Pel-
ham Republican Town Committee wanted to engage in political
advertising for the republican candidates for president and vice
president for the 1980 general election. Their proposed expendi-
tures would have been less than $1000 but would have included
direct mail and local newspaper advertising, which are excluded
from the exemptions." The FEC advised:
Prior to the enactment of the 1979 amendments to the Act and
the promulgation of regulations implementing those amendments,
the described expenditure (not exceeding $1000) by the town
committee could have been made in support of the party's nomi-
nees for President and Vice President without regard to the limits
of 2 U.S.C. 441a(d). . . . However, the 1979 amendments to the
Act and revised (as of April 1, 1980) Commission regulations
which clearly delineate the role of subordinate committees of a
state party, as defined in 11 CFR 100.14, with regard to Federal
elections no longer provide an exemption for such an expenditure
by a subordinate committee.81
Consequently, to utilize direct mail, advertising or a general
public communication for a presidential or vice presidential can-
didate a local party committee has to be designated as an agent
of the national committee and the expenditure has to be re-
ported by the national committee under its co-ordinated expen-
diture limitation. On the other hand, if a local committee wants
to distribute the traditional grass-roots materials that are ex-
empted or conduct a voter drive, it cannot do so with materials
given it by the national committee, or funds donated by the na-
tional committee for that purpose.8 3 Anything emanating from
the national committee is a co-ordinated expenditure and is
counted against those limits.83
79. 87 Op. F.E.C. (1980).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.7(b)(15), .8(b)(16) (1982).
83. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (1976). See also supra text accompanying notes 12-15 (dis-
cussing the statutorily undefined co-ordinated expenditure).
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Since the national committee is unlikely to supply campaign
materials for local use when the money can be more effectively
used for media, this regulation does not work to enhance grass-
roots participation in the democratic process. Furthermore, the
combination of regulations, which limit local committees to vol-
unteer campaign materials and also require that the local com-
mittees raise the money for them is not likely to cement the re-
lationship between the national and local party committees. The
result of these regulations is to force them to operate as totally
independent bodies.
This effect is exacerbated by the regulations" on voter
drives. The exemption for both voter registration and get-out-
the-vote efforts is limited to the national ticket in the general
election."5 If a voter drive refers to another federal candidate in
more than an incidental fashion, the prorated cost is not ex-
empt, but must be counted against either the contribution or co-
ordinated expenditure limits.8 6 Since these limits are state-
wide, 7 their use is controlled by the state party, which is not
required to share with local party committees. Because many
states have signed agency agreements with their party's congres-
sional campaign committees,88 local committees may have to get
authorization from a national committee to run voter drives for
their local federal candidates - an authorization not required
for presidential candidates.8 "
Alternatively, their state party could agree to count the cost
against the state's contribution limit. The limits on contribu-
tions from state and local party committees to a candidate are
the same as from any other political committee: $5000 per elec-
tion for a multicandidate committee, and $1000 otherwise.' 0
However, with a very restricted exception 1 the limit is state-
84. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
85. Id.
86. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii)(3) (1982) (contribution); id. § 431(9)(B)(ix)(3)
(expenditure).
87. Id.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 49-54.
89. Id. See also 2 U.S.C. § 431a(d) (1982). The Act contains no corresponding sec-
tion for presidential candidates.
90. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(2) (1982) (multicandidate $5000 limit); id. § 441a(5)(C)(ii)
($1000 limit).
91. 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(b)(2)(ii)(A)-(B) (1983).
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wide. That is, a state party committee and all of its affiliated
committees share one contribution limit, and all local commit-
tees are presumed to be affiliated. This interpretation is in the
regulations, not in the Act itself.92 The regulations also establish
a joint contribution limit for a party's national committee and
any political committees "established, financed, maintained or
controlled" by it but specifically exempt the House campaign
committee."' Since the national committee and the Senate cam-
paign committee share the much larger contribution limit of
$17,500, the consequence is that Senate candidates can receive
three and one half times more from their national party than
from the state party whose nominee they are, and House candi-
dates can receive twice as much.9
An exception is made for local party committees that are
independent of the state party committee. These committees
can have separate contribution limits. But the requirements are
so stringent that it is unlikely that many exist. To be indepen-
dent a local party committee not only must not be established
by the state party, but cannot have received "funds from any
other political committee established, financed, maintained, or
controlled by any party unit" or have made any contributions in
co-operation or consultation with any other party unit. 5 In
other words, it can be party committee in name only, without
even the rights of non-party political committees to receive con-
tributions from a party and to make independent expenditures.
Not only can the national party committees give more to
candidates, but they can receive more from individuals and mul-
ticandidate committees. By statute, the state and local party
committees can receive $5000 per year, and national party com-
mittees can receive up to $20,000 from individuals and $15,000
from multicandidate committees per year.96 However, regula-
tions and advisory opinions have served to significantly reduce
the amounts that can be given nationally. In several advisory
opinions, the FEC has ruled that not only do the state parties
92. Id. § 110.3(b)(2)(ii).
93. Id. §§ 110.3(b)(1)(i), .3(b)(2)(i).
94. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(h) (1982) (Senate limit); id. § 441(d)(3)(B) (House limit).
95. 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(b)(2)(ii) (1983).
96. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(1)-(2) (1982).
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and their local affiliates share a combined limit on contributions
made but on contributions received.' The regulations make the
opposite "clarification" for the national committees. A party's
national committee, Senate and House campaign committees
can each receive the maximum amount a contributor can give to
national committees.' These clarifications were not in the final
version issued on August 25, 1976."' The FEC's official "Expla-
nation and Justification of Regulations" released the following
April contains language which implies that the additional word-
ing was a result of congressional pressure.
The consequence of these regulations is that the treatment
of state parties very much resembles that of non-party commit-
tees, except for the exemptions of certain campaign materials
and the prohibition on independent expenditures. In effect, the
many party committees in a state are one large committee as far
as the federal election laws are concerned. This is exactly how
the Act treats non-party committees with a diverse and complex
organization.100 The treatment of the national party committees
is much more favorable. They are independent units for the pur-
pose of regulating receipts and disbursements, and the limits on
both of these are higher than the limits for state party commit-
tee and non-party committees. Yet national party committees
are treated as affiliated units for the purpose of agency agree-
ments and transfers. 10 1
Unlimited intra-party transfers was a privilege given to par-
ties in the 1976 revision of the FECA10 1 but the provision has
meaning only insofar as funds are transferred between the state
97. 104 Op. F.E.C. (1976); 39 Op. F.E.C. (1978); 68 Op. F.E.C. (1979); 77 Op. F.E.C.
(1979).
98. 11 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(b)(2)(i), .2(a)(ii) (1983).
99. 41 Fed. Reg. 35948 (1976) (codified at 11 C.F.R § 110.1 (1983)).
100. 11 C.F.R. § 110.3 (1983); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4)-(5) (1982). There is one differ-
ence. Section 441a(a)(4) provides that, unlike local parties and non-party committees, a
state party does not have to contribute to five candidates to qualify as a multicandidate
committee. But it does have to have been registered for six months and have received
contributions from over 50 persons. Prior to the 1976 amendments, local units of labor
organizations, corporations, etc. could set up separate contribution limits. The "anti-
proliferation" amendments in 1976 reduced the ability of such special interest groups to
contribute to candidates they supported but they could still make independent
expenditures.
101. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
102. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(4) (1982).
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and national committees or among the national committees. Be-
cause the state and local party committees share joint contribu-
tion and co-ordinated expenditure limits, funds transferred be-
tween them have no more of an impact than funds transferred
between units of non-party committees. The ability of funds to
flow to party units which may have unused contribution or ex-
penditure limits make them a potent source of party power. If
the national committees shared a single contribution limit with
their state committees or if agency agreements had been prohib-
ited, the transfer provisions would have much less meaning.
The democrats realized how potent this combination was
when the FECA was undergoing further amendments in 1978. In
a move that surprised the Republican Party, the House Admin-
istration Committee reported a bill which would lower the con-
tribution and expenditure limits of parties and other political
committees, restrict the unlimited transfers between party com-
mittees, and combine the separate limits of the national and
congressional committees. The republicans, expecting a bill simi-
lar to that passed by the Senate in 1977 which made relatively
innocuous changes in the FECA, were outraged.0 s After a bar-
rage of criticism that the bill was an attempt to penalize the Re-
publican Party for its greater fund-raising ability, the bill was
defeated with a vote on a technical rule.104 The democrats made
no subsequent legislative attempts to limit party fund raising
ability, but two years later filed their objection to the agency
agreements in district court.10 When the Supreme Court upheld
these agreements in FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, it cited the 1978 "failure to adopt a proposed
amendment" as an inference that Congress had never intended
to preclude agency agreements. 10 6
The question of agency agreements would never have arisen
if Senator Brock's proposed amendment"0 7 to the 1974 Act had
103. 34 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 769 (1978).
104. 124 CONG. REc. 7879-80 (1978).
105. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. FEC, No. 80-01903 (D.D.C. Aug.
28, 1980) (petition filed July 30, 1980). The FEC's motion for summary judgment was
granted on August 28, 1980. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 660 F.2d
773, 776 (1980).
106. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 35-36 (1981).
107. 120 CONG. REC. 9549 (1974) (proposed amendment no. 1102 to FECA).
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been adopted. Noting that the congressional campaign commit-
tees were largely ignored in the expenditure and contribution al-
locations of that year's amendments, he proposed that they be
exempted altogether from the Act's expenditure limits. The Sen-
ate initially adopted the amendment, but reversed itself five
days later.108 This vote was certainly as important as the Su-
preme Court's disregard of the party expenditure limits in Buck-
ley v. Valeo in creating the current structure of the Act.
Nonetheless, in FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee, the Court virtually invited the congressional cam-
paign committees to choose between making coordinated ex-
penditures as agents of the national and state committees, and
independent expenditures as ordinary political committees. In
footnote twenty it noted that "if congressional campaign com-
mittees were not considered as part of the national party, their
ability to make independednt expenditures would seem to es-
cape any limitation prescribed by the Act. '1 09
While the NRSC in FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Cam-
paign Committee made much of being a national committee in
its briefs,110 it is not evident from Buckley that such a choice is
necessary. Indeed there is nothing in Buckley which sanctions
the prohibition on independent expenditures by party commit-
tees. The only other reference to parties beyond those in foot-
notes sixty-six and sixty-seven, discussed earlier, is one where
the Court compares the expenditure limitations on parties to
those on campaign organizations as providing "substantially
greater room for discussion and debate."1' Since the Court later
discussed the limitations on campaign organizations out of exis-
tence, it might well have done the same for parties.
VI. Buckley Criteria as Applied to Political Party
Nonetheless it is possible to ask if the criteria developed for
justifying limitations on contributions are applicable to parties.
108. 120 CONG. REc. 9551 (1974) (Brock Amendment adopted Apr. 3, 1974); 120
Cong. 10,062-64 (1974) (Clark Amendment, to repeal Brock Amendment, adopted Apr. 8,
1974).
109. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 40 (1981).
110. Brief of Petitioner, National Republican Senatorial Comm. at 13-14, FEC v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
111. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976).
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The only compelling state interest the Court acknowledged as
legitimate to restrict financial contributions was "the actuality
and appearance of corruption."' 1 2 It said this interest was suffi-
cient to overcome first amendment rights when applied to con-
tributions but not to independent expenditures for three rea-
sons: 1) "The quantity of communication by the contributor
does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution,
since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, sym-
bolic act of contributing."'"" 2) While the "Act's contribution
ceilings thus limit one important means of associating with a
candidate or committee, [they] leave the contributor free to be-
come a member of any political association and assist personally
in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates. '" 4 3) "The
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure
with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of
the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger
that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate."'1
These justifications will be examined in regard to their po-
tential application to a political party. First, symbolic expression
of support for a candidate may be adequate for an individual or
a non-party political association but it is a hollow shell for a ma-
jor political party. The Democratic and Republican Parties in
the United States exist only to elect their candidates. In so far
as they promote issues they do it through their candidates.
Their lack of a cohesive ideological message, their acceptance of
any candidate who chooses to bear their label and their focus on
winning elections make it clear that the quantity of the commu-
nication does increase with the quantity of the contribution. To
restrict their ability to support their candidates is to restrict the
only form of political expression that has any meaning to a ma-
jor political party.
Second, independent expenditures provide individuals and
non-party committees with an alternative form of political ex-
pression to contributions. Under current FEC regulations, this
112. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
113. Id. at 21.
114. Id. at 22.
115. Id. at 47.
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alternative is not available to political parties. 116 Only individu-
als can personally assist a candidate. Since a party is not a tan-
gible person its assistance necessarily takes on a material form.
Recruiting volunteers is material assistance, as is donating the
time of paid staff members. Like associations and candidates,
parties can "aggregate large sums of money to promote effective
advocacy. 11 7 But unlike them it cannot spend all of that money
to advocate the election of its candidates. If the limitation on
independent expenditures violates "the original basis for the
recognition of First Amendment protection of the freedom of as-
sociation""" by precluding "most associations from effectively
amplifying the voice of their adherents"'1 9 surely this is as true
for party as for non-party associations.
Third, while the FEC's claim that parties are incapable of
making independent expenditures undermines the Court's ra-
tionale for limiting contributions, it does focus more attention
on the Court's concern with quid pro quos. If a party is incapa-
ble of acting independently from its candidates, 20 is there nec-
essarily the danger of corruption or the appearance of corruption
that there is for individuals and non-party associations? The an-
swer must begin with a definition of corruption. Unfortunately,
there is no definition of corruption available in the federal cases
on election laws - even those on the original Corrupt Practices
Acts which were superseded by the FECA - to provide a stan-
dard for such an analysis.' 2 ' Ironically, the Court has rested the
constitutionality of a major piece of political legislation on an
undefined term.
Court definitions of corruption in other contexts are not
much help. They generally appear in decisions involving fraud,
jury tampering or on more general obstructions of justice, and
usually involve an "evil or impure motive. 1 1 22 Black's Law Dic-
116. 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b)(4) (1983).
117. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
118. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
119. Id.
120. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
121. Although the federal statute defining bribery uses "corruptly," 18 U.S.C. §
201(c) (1976), it does not define "corruptly." See generally Note, Campaign Contribu-
tions and Federal Bribery Law, 92 HARV. L. REv. 451 (1978).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (mail
fraud); United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 242 (10th Cir. 1979) (jury tampering); United
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tionary defines corruption as
an act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent
with official duty and the rights of others. The act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station
or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another
person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.12
This definition has some meaning in the non-electoral context
where an official's salary is paid by the entity to whom loyalty is
owed. Money or things of value received from others are auto-
matically suspect.
In the electoral context, money and things of value from
others are necessary to get the job. In order to get them, an
elected official looks to those in whose interest the office holder
generally acts. The intent of most political activists and political
associations is to influence the official acts of elected officials. In
this effort the distinction between "influence" and "undue influ-
ence" is not very clear.
Any attempt to make this distinction has both an empirical
and an analytical component. Empirically, if one could define
corruption one might be able to ascertain if parties have engaged
in the practice. But even without such a definition, one can ask
about appearance. Historically, there certainly has been a belief
that parties were capable of corruption. Most of the state laws
regulating parties passed at the turn of the century were in-
tended to eliminate perceived corruption. This was done
through the creation of the civil service to deprive parties of pa-
tronage jobs, and direct primaries to deprive them of their con-
trol over nomination.12 4 However, the FECA only looks to the
corrupting power of money, and it is not clear that parties have
used money to control their elected officials, perhaps because in-
cumbency creates its own power. In fact, a major purpose behind
the original federal restriction on corporate contributions was
not to keep corporations from controlling candidates, but to
keep parties from assessing corporations for campaign
contributions. 125
States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 115 n.229 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (obstruction of justice).
123. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 311 (5th ed. 1979).
124. A. RANNEY, supra note 55, at 121-31.
125. E. SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CORRUPT PRACTICES LEGISLATION 188-90 (1928).
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Currently, there does not appear to be a widespread belief
that parties exercise undue influence over their candidates. As
Representative Quillen (R. Tenn.) stated in the 1978 debate over
the proposed amendments which would further restrict the abil-
ity of parties to make contributions and expenditures,'2 6
[if it is reform we are after, why reduce the ability of the politi-
cal parties to support its candidates? How can the Republican
Party unduly influence a Republican candidate? How can the
Democratic Party unduly influence a Democratic candidate? On
what basis should the ability of the two political parties to sup-
port their candidates be prevented?""7
This was not challenged. Even the Supreme Court appears to be
operating under the same assumption. In FEC v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee,"28 where the Court decided
unanimously that agency agreements did not promote the ap-
pearance or reality of corruption, it stated approvingly that
"[a]gency agreements may permit all party committees to bene-
fit from fundraising, media expertise, and economies of scale. In
turn, effective use of party resources in support of party candi-
dates may encourage candidate loyalty and responsiveness to the
party. 12 9 One does not encourage loyalty and responsiveness to
a provider of campaign contributions if the relationship is per-
ceived as potentially corrupting.
Analytically, one should ask what parties would want from
candidates in exchange for financial support. Perhaps the parties
want nothing. It benefits all party members to have many people
bearing the party label in Congress because the majority party
has a great deal more power than the minority. Even if parties
were to ask for a quid pro quo vote in exchange for campaign
contributions, is this considered corruption? In parliamentary
political systems, voting the way one is told is usually a require-
ment for bearing the party's label, let alone receiving campaign
contributions. Among political scientists this is called the "re-
sponsible parties model" and there is extensive literature urging
126. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
127. 124 CONG. R c. 7872 (1978).
128. 454 U.S. 27 (1981).
129. Id. at 42.
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its adoption in the United States.130
Since political parties would not exist without candidates, at
least not as parties, one might also ask whether it is useful to
distinguish them from their candidates. The FEC regulations
imply that this cannot be done.131 If a party is so tied to its can-
didate that it cannot act independently in support of them, it
would follow that to restrain a party's support is equivalent to
limiting the candidate's ability to speak for himself or herself. If
a party speaks through its candidates, to deprive it of support-
ing those candidates is to violate the first amendment's proscrip-
tion "upon the freedom of a candidate to speak without legisla-
tive limit on behalf of his own candidacy.''1
2
One might also take the Court's comparison of parties with
campaign organizations a step further. It stated that corruption
as a compelling state interest does not apply to campaign ex-
penditures because the danger of candidate dependence on large
contributions is pre-empted by those limitations. " Since parties
do not create their own money - or earn it - but must get it
under the same conditions as campaigns (albeit with a larger
limit), it would seem that unearmarked expenditures on behalf
of its own candidates would be similarly untainted. Parties
would act as a buffer between candidates and supporters, serv-
ing to mute their individual influence. They are not likely to
support more than one candidate for a given general election, so
there is little chance of their using contributions to insure that
the winner is always indebted to them. Instead, insofar as a can-
didate is representing its party, the party is promoting itself.
By now it should be evident that if corruption is the sole
basis for restricting the use of campaign money, the application
of the FECA to political parties is anomalous. If parties can cor-
rupt - however defined - their candidates, then why treat
them differently from other multicandidate committees? Higher
contribution or co-ordinated expenditure limits might pass a ra-
tional basis test, since that test requires a minimal threshold,
130. Report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science
Association, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System (1950).
131. See supra text accompanying note 27.
132. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 54.
133. Id. at 58.
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but the prohibition on independent expenditures would not pass
first amendment scrutiny. However, if parties cannot corrupt
their own candidates there is no constitutional basis for restrict-
ing independent expenditures or contributions. If a party's only
effective means of political expression is through its candidates,
then the "First Amendment denies government the power to de-
termine that spending to promote one's political views is waste-
ful, excessive, or unwise.' 34
VII. Application of FECA to Political Party: Unfinished
Business
Whether or not the Supreme Court ever takes up the unfin-
ished business of applying the FECA in light of Buckley to po-
litical parties, one might still speculate on the consequences. If
restraints on party support of their candidates were held uncon-
stitutional the effect would most likely be different for each ma-
jor party, and for each level of party organization.
While congressional rhetoric has not distinguished between
national, state and local parties, congressional action has.138 The
national party committees are distinctly favored. The amount of
money that can be donated to them is much greater than for the
state parties, as is the amount that they can spend in candidate
support. The treatment of state and local committees as one
committee for purposes of receipts, disbursements, and in some
cases reporting, discourages independent action by local commit-
tees, historically the workhorses of the party system. The treat-
ment of the national committees as independent for purposes of
receipts and disbursements, and interrelated for purposes of
fund transfers and agency agreements, facilitates their access to
resources and independent action.
Furthermore, the definitions of contributions and expendi-
tures, expressed in the FECA, the regulations and the Advisory
Opinions, compel fragmentation of the aid local committees can
give federal candidates by type of office, election, and kind of
support. The paperwork requirements of reporting and the FEC
enforcement procedures, not discussed, are more burdensome1 3 6
134. Id. at 57.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
136. See generally Note, The Federal Election Commission, the First Amendment,
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on local parties than on national committees.
As described earlier, the combined state-and-local party
committee is treated by the FECA virtually the same as a non-
party political committee, except that it can make co-ordinated
expenditures and it cannot make independent expenditures.
13 7
Since the former expenditures are largely signed away through
agency agreements, at least for the Republican Party, and are
not applicable to the national ticket, the state-and-local party is
in reality in a much weaker position to provide support for its
candidates than non-party committees. Thus, removal of the in-
dependent expenditure limits would put it on the same footing
as other multicandidate committees. However, since the agency
agreements seem to be a consequence of the state party's inade-
quate fundraising ability, such removal might not have a major
effect on financial support unless contribution limits to parties
were also raised, or the state and local committees had separate
contribution limits. Fragmentation, however, might be reduced
by making it easier for local party committees to provide other
kinds of support such as local advertising for presidential candi-
dates, or combined get-out-the-vote drives which "pull" for
other federal candidates without worrying about authorization
for use of a co-ordinated expenditure limit. Parties might not be
able to use independent expenditures as effectively as non-party
committees for "negative" campaigns 3 8 since their identification
with their own candidates would taint them in ways that non-
party committees do not. Furthermore, it is unlikely that state-
and-local party committees would ever be able to raise the funds
of the more professional non-party committees because they are
less able to reach a national constituency and lack the appeal of
a single emotional issue.
Whether the removal of the prohibition on independent ex-
penditures for the national committee would increase their cam-
paign strength even more depends on their fund raising ability
and their ability to meet the FEC's stringent criteria for inde-
and Due Process, 89 YALE L.J. 1199 (1980) (discussing the inherent burdens in FEC
requirements).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
138. Negative campaign funding is a common usage for describing money spent ad-
vocating the defeat of an opponent, rather than the positive promotion of the candidate.
See, e.g., 8 F.E.C. Rec. 7 (No. 3, Mar. 1982).
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pendence. If any national committee will benefit, it will be the
Republican Party since they raised four times the money of the
Democratic Party. The national committees' sources of strength
are the higher limits on co-ordinated expenditures, the much
higher limits on contributions to them, and the fact that there
are three national party committees to which one can contribute,
while each state-and-local party is the equivalent to one. The
NRSC is quite aware of the beneficial effect of the FECA. Its
literature states:
The Committee's early low-key existence was challenged by
the 1974 revisions of the Federal Campaign Laws. Most impor-
tant were the new restrictions limiting an individual's contribu-
tion to $1,000 per federal campaign, but up to the maximum of
$25,000. The need for a more active Senate campaign committee,
to make use of the money it could raise, was made clear by the
difficulty individual campaigns had in fundraising, and by the
large number of Democratic incumbents the Republicans needed
to challenge to gain control.
The 1974 Campaign Act. . . allowed for expenditures on be-
half of each Senate candidate up to four cents per eligible voter in
his or her state. This "four cent money" breaks down to two cents
which state party organizations may spend on behalf of their Sen-
ate candidates and two cents which the national party organiza-
tion may spend. In most states, the state parties assign the right
to spend their two cents to the NRSC. . . . This total "four
cent" expenditure can range from $90,000 in less populous states
to $1.2 million in California, the most populous state. 39
As long as this amount of money continues to be spendable
by the national party committees - and they can raise it -
they will be major determiners of campaign strength regardless
of independent expenditures. Instead of just permitting parties
independent expenditures if all restrictions were to be removed,
the balance might shift. Candidates might have a choice of re-
ceiving party money as contributions to be spent as they prefer,
rather than on their behalf, and local state party committees
would not have any restrictions on their ability to support their
candidates. They would not have to worry about allocation, con-
tribution and expenditure limits, refraining from activities which
139. Leaflet, NRSC, Origins of the NRSC.
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violate the FECA, engaging in fundraising events (which are also
party builders) or competing with their state and local party
committees for a given individual's contribution.
This kind of shift would be more likely to favor the demo-
crats than the republicans because it would remove restraints
from that party level where the democrats are strongest. For
many decades the Democratic Party had developed an effective
organization only during the immediacy of a campaign year and
then mostly confined to the state and local level."1 0 The most
powerful democratic organizations have traditionally been in
major cities while the national party has often been no more
than a common label for highly contentious components. The
Republican Party developed a substantial national organization
which effectively asserted national control while the Democratic
Party was building local machines. As many commentators have
noted"' increased centralization and nationalization has been a
trend in both parties for the last thirty years. This trend has
shifted the resources necessary for electoral success from strong
local organizations to professional expertise and fund raising
ability - a shift in which the Republican Party has a head start.
Removing restraints from state and local party expenditures and
increasing the contribution limits to them might counterbalance
this trend - or at least slow it down. This would benefit the
democrats.
Reform has many unintended consequences, and those of
the decade's revisions of the federal election laws are still mak-
ing themselves felt. The impact of these laws on political parties
has many anomalies. The business of resolving them is not yet
finished.
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